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ARE PHARMACISTS RESPONSIBLE FOR PHYSICIANS'
PRESCRIPTION ERRORS? McKee v. American Home Products,
113 Wash. 2d 701, 782 P.2d 1045 (1989).
Abstract In McKee v. American Home Products, the Washington Supreme Court held
that pharmacists' duties do not include contacting physicians who make judgment errors
when prescribing medication. When physicians make obvious errors, however, juries
decide whether pharmacists should contact physicians. This Note examines McKee and
proposes that either juries should determine pharmacists' duties in all cases or, alterna-
tively, the legislature should require pharmacists to contact physicians whenever prescrip-
tions as issued could harm patients.
For ten years, Elaine McKee's pharmacists filled her prescriptions
for a drug that she should have taken for no more than a few weeks. I
During those ten years, McKee's pharmacists neither informed her
physician that refilling the prescription was harmful nor warned
McKee of potential health dangers.2 When McKee was injured by
long-term use of the drug, she sued her pharmacists, alleging they
were negligent for failing to inform either her or her physician of the
prescription error.' The superior court granted summary judgment for
the defendant pharmacists.4
On direct appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the grant
of summary judgment.5 The court held that McKee's pharmacists
were not responsible for detecting the error or contacting her physi-
cian.6 The court distinguished between 'judgment" errors and "obvi-
ous" errors and determined that McKee's physician had made a
judgment error.7 Thus, McKee's pharmacists could fll the prescrip-
tion as issued without first notifying her physician.8 According to the
McKee court, juries determine whether the pharmacist should have
contacted the physician in cases involving obvious errors.9
This Note critically examines the Washington Supreme Court's
holding in McKee. It reviews pharmacists' duties in Washington and
other jurisdictions and the Washington Supreme Court's traditional
protection of public safety. Next, it analyzes the McKee opinion and
criticizes the court's analysis on three independent grounds. First, the
1. McKee v. American Home Products, 113 Wash. 2d 701, 703, 782 P.2d 1045, 1046 (1989).
2. Id at 704, 714, 782 P.2d at 1047, 1052.
3. Id at 704, 714, 782 P.2d at 1047, 1052.
4. id at 705, 782 P.2d at 1047.
5. Id at 707, 782 P.2d at 1047-48.
6. Id at 720, 782 P.2d at 1055-56.
7. Id at 715-16, 782 P.2d at 1053.
8. Id at 716, 782 P.2d at 1053.
9. See id at 715, 782 P.2d at 1053.
Washington Law Review
majority's rule creates a distinction that is arbitrary, unpredictable,
and inconsistent with current legislation. Second, if the distinction
between error types is significant, juries, not courts, should classify
errors. Third, court determination of pharmacists' duty of care via a
distinction of error types is inconsistent with Washington statutes.
This Note therefore concludes that in each case a jury should deter-
mine the scope and content of a pharmacist's duties. Alternatively,
the Washington legislature in response to McKee could amend statutes
to require that pharmacists contact physicians whenever pharmacists
are aware that prescriptions as issued could harm patients.
I. PHARMACISTS' DUTIES: STATUTORY AND PUBLIC
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Washington law requires pharmacists to maintain and review
records of prescriptions filled. As health care providers, pharmacists
are statutorily required to exercise the care society expects of reason-
ably prudent members of their profession. Prior Washington Supreme
Court decisions evidence an intent to protect consumers from poten-
tially harmful goods and services by expanding the liability of their
suppliers. In contradiction to applicable precedent, the court in
McKee greatly limited pharmacists' duty of care. Courts of other
jurisdictions, however, take a wide range of approaches to pharma-
cists' responsibility for harmful prescriptions.
A. Pharmacists' Statutory Duties
1. Procedural Duties
Presently, Washington statutes and administrative regulations
impose three types of procedural duties on pharmacists. First, phar-
macists must maintain detailed prescription records for at least two
years on every prescription filled."° These records must include: the
date, name, drug strength, dosage form, and quantity of drugs dis-
pensed; refill instructions; prescribing physicians' names and
addresses; and patients' allergies, idiosyncrasies, and chronic condi-
tions relating to drug use. ll Second, pharmacists must review these
records for possible drug interactions, reactions, or therapeutic dupli-
cations,12 monitor for improper drug use, and consult with prescribing
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.64.245 (Supp. 1990); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 360-16-096 (1986).
This duty includes the original prescription, refills, and refill authorizations and limitations.
11. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 360-19-030 to -040 (1986).
12. A therapeutic duplication occurs when two or more drugs have an "additive or
synergistic effect" when used together. Id. at § 360-19-020(5).
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physicians about improper drug use if necessary.13 Third, when
patients transfer prescriptions between pharmacies, transferee and
transferor pharmacists must maintain records of the transfer.14 Trans-
feror pharmacists may not issue refills after transferring the
prescription.15
2. Statutory Standard of Care
Pharmacists are "health care providers."' 6 Health care providers
owe a duty of care defined by statute. This duty has broadened over
time from the standard of care required in the profession's practice to
a standard of "reasonable prudence"; subsequently, "reasonable pru-
dence" has been amended to "society's expectations."
At one time, Washington law required health care providers to exer-
cise the care practiced by members of their profession. 17 In Helling v.
Carey, II the Washington Supreme Court abandoned this standard in
favor of a "reasonable prudence" test. In Helling, the court held that
"reasonable prudence" required ophthalmologists to perform
glaucoma tests on all patients, even though this practice had not been
regular conduct in the ophthalmology profession.' 9 The court rea-
soned that public safety mandates that ophthalmologists perform the
simple, inexpensive glaucoma test in all cases to prevent blindness in
those few patients who develop glaucoma.20
After Helling, the Washington legislature passed statutes explicitly
defining health care providers' duty of care.2' The statutes provide
that health care providers breach the statutory standard of care when
they fail to exercise the degree of care expected of reasonably prudent
health care providers. 2 Plaintiffs may recover damages when a health
care provider's breach of the standard of care proximately causes the
plaintiff's injury. 3
13. Ia
14. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 360-16-094 (Supp. 1987-88).
15. a
16. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.70.020 (1989).
17. See Note, Physicians and Surgeons-Malpractice-Court Disregard for the Standard of the
Profession-the Legislative Response-Helling v. Carey, 51 WASH. L. REv. 167, 169-70 (1975).
18. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (1974).
19. Id. Prior to the plaintiff's suit, ophthalmologists did not routinely perform the test for
patients under 40, principally because the incidence of glaucoma in that age group was one in
25,000. Id at 518, 519 P.2d at 983.
20. Ia at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
21. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.70.020-.040 (1989).
22. Id. at § 7.70.040.
23. Id. at § 7.70.030.
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The Washington Supreme Court interpreted the new statutory stan-
dard of care in Harris v. Robert C. Groth, M.D., Inc. 24 In Harris, plain-
tiff's suit alleged that her physician negligently failed to diagnose her
glaucoma." The court upheld a jury verdict in favor of the physi-
cian. 6 The court held that the standard of care is what society expects
of reasonably prudent health care providers, not what the particular
health care providers expect of their profession.27
B. Protecting Consumers' Health: The Washington Supreme Court's
Tradition
The Washington Supreme Court has a long history of protecting
consumers' health by holding providers of harmful goods and services
liable for the injuries their products cause. 28 The most notable exam-
ples are Helling v. Carey29 and Falk v. Keene Corp.30 In Helling, the
court expanded ophthalmologists' duty of care, holding that broad-
ened protection for patients was reasonable because the burden on
ophthalmologists to perform the tests was small in relation to the
potential damage the tests would prevent.31
Similarly, in Falk, the court again demonstrated its intent to protect
public safety by reestablishing a "consumer expectations" test for
manufacturer design defects.3 2 In Falk, plaintiff brought a personal
injury action against an asbestos insulation manufacturer, alleging that
he developed cancer as a result of asbestos exposure. 33 The Washing-
ton legislature had passed statutory guidelines determining when
plaintiffs may recover from manufacturers of defective products.3 4
24. 99 Wash. 2d 438, 445, 663 P.2d 113, 117 (1983).
25. Id. at 440, 663 P.2d at 114.
26. Id. at 451, 663 P.2d at 120. The court upheld the jury verdict because the plaintiff's
proposed jury instructions were incorrect. Id.
27. Id. at 445, 663 P.2d at 117. The court stated that "[n]othing in the statute... suggests
that ['expected by the medical profession'], rather than 'expected by society', is the proper
reading. It is society and their patients to whom physicians are responsible, not solely their
fellow practitioners." Id.
28. These decisions are consistent with a traditional common law notion that suppliers of
goods are responsible for the safety of the goods they supply. See, e.g., Heaven v. Pender, 11
Q.B.D. 503 (1883) (dock owner held liable after his defective ropes injured a dock user).
29. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
30. 113 Wash. 2d 645, 782 P.2d 974 (1989).
31. 83 Wash. 2d at 518, 519 P.2d at 983; see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
32. 113 Wash. 2d at 654-55, 782 P.2d at 980. The "consumer expectations" test in Falk
differs from pharmacists' "society's expectations" standard only in its wording. The phrase
"consumers of prescription drugs" is essentially synonymous with "society" because virtually
every member of society consumes prescription drugs.
33. Id. at 646, 782 P.2d at 975-76.
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(1)(a), .030(3) (1989).
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These statutes provide that manufacturers are liable if the likelihood
and seriousness of harm outweigh the burden on the manufacturer to
design a safer product.35 The legislature further provided that courts
may consider "consumer expectations," but that consumer expecta-
tions alone do not determine products' defectiveness.36 The court,
however, expanded the legislature's guidelines by holding that prod-
ucts are defective if they are unsafe beyond that contemplated by ordi-
nary consumers.37 In essence, the Falk court determined that what
consumers expect of a product is dispositive of the scope and content
of the duty its providers owe.
C. Approaches of Other Jurisdictions
Other jurisdictions have also addressed the issue of pharmacists'
duty to notify physicians. Although they span the spectrum of pos-
sibilities, pharmacists' duties to notify physicians fall within three gen-
eral categories: (1) as a matter of law, pharmacists have a duty to
contact physicians about any unusual prescriptions;38 (2) whether
pharmacists' duties include contacting physicians about errors is a
question of fact for the jury to decide;39 and (3) as a matter of law,
pharmacists have no duty to contact physicians about any errors.' °
Maryland imposes the highest duty on pharmacists to protect
patients from effects of drugs purchased under erroneous prescrip-
tions. In People's Service Drug Stores v. Somerville,4' a physician pre-
scribed strychnine to help the plaintiff with his illness. The dose
35. I at § 7.72.030(I)(a).
36. Id. at § 7.72.030(3).
37. Falk, 113 Wash. 2d at 654-55, 782 P.2d at 980.
38. See eg., People's Serv. Drug Stores v. Somerville, 161 Md. 662, 158 A. 12 (1932); see also
infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
39. Se e.g., Hendricks v. Charity Hosp. of New Orleans, 519 So. 2d 163 (La. Ct. App. 1987)
(the trier of fact properly decided that a pharmacist was not liable for failing to contact a
physician about an excessive dose when the pharmacist put a warning on the medication's label
advising the patient to consult his physician about the prescription); Clayton v. Carroll Drug
Co., 136 N.L. 407, 56 A.2d 732 (1948) (jury properly decided that a pharmacist was not liable
for filling a prescription when the pharmacist contacted the physician, the physician modified the
prescription, and the patient subsequently died); Hand v. Krakowski, 89 A.D.2d 650, 453
N.Y.S.2d 121 (1982); see also infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Jones v. Irvin, 602 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. I11. 1985) (pharmacist held not liable for a
patient's death when the pharmacist filled a prescription calling for an excessive dose without
first contacting the physician); Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store, 457 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 138 Ill. App. 3d 124,485 N.E.2d 551 (1985); Adkins v. Mong,
168 Mich. App. 726, 425 N.W.2d 151 (1988) (pharmacist held not liable for filling a prescription
calling for an excessive dose without first contacting the physician); see also infra notes 52-61
and accompanying text.
41. 161 Md. 662, 158 A. 12 (1932).
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prescribed was extremely high and seriously injured the plaintiff.42
The plaintiff sued the pharmacist, alleging that the pharmacist was
negligent for filling the prescription without first contacting the physi-
cian.43 The Maryland Court of Appeals stated in dicta that when pre-
scribed doses are unusual, pharmacists must notify physicians of the
error prior to filling the prescription.'
In New York,45 Louisiana,46 and New Jersey,47 however, courts
have held that juries decide whether pharmacists' duties include con-
tacting physicians about prescription errors. For example, in Hand v.
Krakowski, 4 a patient died after ingesting a drug contraindicated with
alcohol.49 The pharmacist's records indicated that the patient was an
alcoholic." The New York Appellate Division reversed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for the pharmacist, holding that
whether pharmacists' duties include notifying physicians of prescrip-
tion errors is a triable question of fact."
Courts in Florida,52 Illinois,53 and Michigan54 have made rulings
going further than the McKee majority. These courts have taken a
third approach and held that as a matter of law pharmacists have no
duty to contact physicians about any error. 5  In Eldridge v. Eli Lilly
& Co.,56 a pharmacist filled a prescription calling for an obviously
excessive dose without first contacting the patient's physician. The
patient died from the overdose." The plaintiff argued that pharmacists
have a duty to contact physicians about dangerous prescriptions
because pharmacists have greater knowledge of drugs' propensities
than physicians." The court stated, however, that prescriptions' pro-
priety depend not only on the drug's propensities, but also on the
42. Id. at 12-13.
43. Id. at 13.
44. Id. at 14.
45. See, e.g., Hand v. Krakowski, 89 A.D.2d 650, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1982).
46. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Charity Hosp. of New Orleans, 519 So. 2d 163 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
47. See, e.g., Clayton v. Carroll Drug Co., 136 N.J.L. 407, 56 A.2d 732 (1948).
48. 89 A.D.2d 651, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1982).
49. A contraindication is "a circumstance under which the drug must never be given." Id. at
123 (quoting Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400, 402, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1979)).
50. Id. at 122.
51. Id. at 123.
52. See, e.g., Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store, 457 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
53. See, e.g., Jones v. Irvin, 602 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ill. 1985); Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 138
Ill. App. 3d 124, 485 N.E.2d 551 (1985).
54. See, e.g., Adkins v. Mong, 168 Mich. App. 726, 425 N.W.2d 151 (1988).
55. See supra notes 52-54.
56. 138 Ill. App. 3d 124, 485 N.E.2d 551 (1985).
57. Id. at 552.
58. Id. at 553.
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patient's condition. Therefore, doses that are appropriate for one
patient may be excessive for others.5 9 The court reasoned that impos-
ing a duty to contact physicians would require pharmacists to learn
patients' conditions and monitor drug use, which would interfere with
physician-patient relationships and could constitute practicing
medicine without a license. ° As a result, the court held that as a mat-
ter of law pharmacists have no duty to contact physicians about any
dangerous prescription.6
D. McKee v. American Home Products
The Washington Supreme Court first considered pharmacists' duty
of care in McKee v. American Home Products.62 For ten years,
McKee's physician prescribed Plegine, a potentially addictive amphet-
amine used to help obese patients lose weight.6" Plegine's manufac-
turer included warnings on the drug's labels stating that patients
should take the drug for no more than a few weeks because thereafter
patients become immune to the drug's anorectic effect."4 The warnmg
listed possible side effects, such as extreme fatigue, dependence, and
psychosis.6 McKee took nearly all of her prescriptions for Plegine to
one Seattle pharmacy.6 One pharmacist filled her prescription for
seven years and another for the remaining three years.67 McKee's
pharmacists removed the manufacturer's warning labels from the
drug's bottles prior to sale.6 8 The pharmacists told neither McKee nor
her physician that patients should use Plegine for no more than a few
weeks.69 McKee became addicted to Plegine and, consequently, suf-
fered both physically and psychologically.7' McKee's suit alleged that
the pharmacists breached their duty of care by neither contacting her
physician about the error nor warning her of the drug's adverse
59. Id
60. Id
61. Id Similarly, in Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store, 457 So. 2d 561 (Fla, Dist. Ct. App. 1984), a
patient became addicted to a drug prescribed to him for nine years. The court held that as a
matter of law pharmacists have no duty to notify physicians about erroneous prescriptions. Id
at 562. The court expressly limited its holding to the precise facts of Pysz and recognized
potential liability for pharmacists. Id The court did not indicate, however, when it would hold
pharmacists liable.
62. 113 Wash. 2d 701, 782 P.2d 1045 (1989).
63. Id at 703, 782 P.2d at 1046.
64. Id
65. Id. at 703-04, 782 P.2d at 1046.
66. Id. at 704, 782 P.2d at 1047.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 722, 782 P.2d at 1056 (Dore, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 704, 782 P.2d at 1047.
70. Id
965
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effects.71 The trial court granted the pharmacists' motion for summary
judgment, and McKee appealed to the supreme court.72
In a 5-4 decision, the supreme court issued two rulings. First, the
majority affirmed the summary judgment because McKee's expert wit-
ness was unqualified.73 Second, the majority held as a matter of law
that pharmacists have no duty to contact physicians about judgment
errors.74 The majority stated that while it did not need to reach this
second ruling, it was appropriate to do so because of the public interest
involved.75
Most significant was the majority's ruling with respect to pharma-
cists' duty of care. The majority held that pharmacists' liability turns
on the nature of a physician's error.7 6 The majority divided physicians'
errors into two categories, judgment errors and obvious errors.77 The
court defined obvious errors to include "obvious lethal dosages, inade-
quacies in the instructions, known contraindications, 8 or incompatible
prescriptions."79 When a court determines that the case involves an
obvious error, the scope of pharmacists' duty of care is a question of
fact; juries must decide whether defendant pharmacists had a duty to
contact the physician who issued the prescription."0 The majority
determined that the error in McKee was a judgment error.81 The court
held that pharmacists' duties do not include contacting physicians
71. Id. at 704, 714, 782 P.2d at 1047, 1052.
72. The Washington Supreme Court granted direct review of the trial court's decision. Id. at
705, 782 P.2d at 1047.
73. Id. at 706-07, 782 P.2d at 1048. In opposition to the pharmacists' summary judgment
motion, McKee provided an affidavit of an Arizona physician. Id. at 706, 782 P.2d at 1048. The
majority held that only pharmacists licensed to practice in Washington can testify to
pharmacists' duty of care. Id. at 707, 782 P.2d at 1048.
74. Id. at 716, 782 P.2d at 1053.
75. Id. at 707, 782 P.2d at 1048.
76. Id. at 715-16, 782 P.2d at 1053. It was unnecessary for the court to reach this second
ruling because the court had already affirmed the summary judgment. The court affirmed the
summary judgment because McKee had failed to prove the duty of care required by the statute.
Id. at 706 n.3, 782 P.2d at 1048 n.3. No material issue of fact existed because the court
determined that the Arizona physician was unqualified to testify to pharmacists' duty of care in
Washington. Id. at 707, 782 P.2d at 1048. The court nevertheless continued to analyze
pharmacists' duties in detail, deeming such analysis in "the public interest." Id. Whether the
second ruling is or is not dicta, other Washington courts confronting similar issues in the future
likely will view themselves bound by the full McKee opinion. Therefore, the court's opinion
regarding pharmacists' duty of care is treated as a holding for purposes of this Note.
77. See id. at 715-16, 782 P.2d at 1053.
78. For a definition of contraindications, see supra note 49.
79. Id. at 715, 782 P.2d at 1053.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 716, 782 P.2d at 1053.
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who make judgment errors and that courts may decide judgment error
cases as a matter of law.8 2
The majority based this holding on the concern that requiring phar-
macists to contact physicians about judgment errors would place an
undue burden on pharmacists and cause antagonism between pharma-
cists and physicians.8 3 Further, the majority noted that physicians
often have valid reasons for deviating from drug manufacturers' rec-
ommendations. 4 The court believed that pharmacists are often una-
ware of these reasons because they lack physicians' medical education
and knowledge of patients' medical histories."5 Therefore, according to
the majority, courts should not hold pharmacists liable for failing to
contact physicians about judgment errors.8 6 The four-member dissent
argued vigorously against both holdings. First, the dissent stated that
McKee's expert witness was qualified. 7 The dissent noted that testi-
mony of physicians from other states is admissible to aid juries in
determining pharmacists' duty of care. 8 Second, the dissent argued
that pharmacists' duties are always a question of fact. 9 Because the
standard of care is defined by society's expectations and juries are a
microcosm of society, juries are in the best position to assess pharma-
cists' duty of care.90 Accordingly, juries and not courts must make
these determinations.91 The dissent argued that the majority's rule
regarding judgment errors "is, at best, unnecessary and, at worst, a
usurpation of the Legislature's power." 92
II. , PHARMACISTS SHOULD ALERT PHYSICIANS TO
PRESCRIPTION ERRORS
The majority unwisely created separate rules for judgment errors
and obvious errors. Instead, the court should allow juries to deter-
mine pharmacists' duty of care in all cases. If the court is determined
to rely on its current distinction, the Washington legislature should
amend current statutes to require pharmacists to notify physicians
82. Id. at 720, 782 P.2d at 1055-56.
83. Id at 716, 782 P.2d at 1053.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 711, 782 P.2d at 1051.
86. Id. at 716, 782 P.2d at 1053.
87. Id. at 730, 782 P.2d at 1061 (Dore, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 731, 782 P.2d at 1061 (Dore, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 724, 782 P.2d at 1057 (Dore, ., dissenting).
90. Id. at 723, 782 P.2d at 1057 (Dore, J., dissenting).
91. Id at 724, 782 P.2d at 1057 (Dore, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
967
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whenever pharmacists know or should know that prescriptions, as
issued, may harm patients.
A. Jury Determination of Pharmacists' Duty of Care
The McKee court erred in two ways. First, the majority's distinc-
tion between error types creates a rule that is unpredictable and allows
courts to deny pharmacists' liability, thus circumventing the legisla-
ture's "society's expectations" test.93 Second, if the court continues to
rely on distinctions between error types, it should adopt a rule requir-
ing juries to classify errors. Jury determination assures compliance
with the "society's expectations" test. A preferable approach, how-
ever, is for juries, not judges, to determine pharmacists' duties in all
cases. These approaches accord with prior Washington Supreme
Court decisions favoring public protection from potentially harmful
products and services.
1. Distinction Between Judgment Errors and Obvious Errors
There is no justifiable basis for the majority's determination that
obviously excessive doses are "judgment errors," considering that it
labeled indistinguishable types of errors "obvious errors." Obvious
errors include "obvious lethal dosages, inadequacies in the instruc-
tions, known contraindications, [and] incompatible prescriptions."94
The court, however, classified non-lethal, but obviously excessive
doses as judgment errors.95
Logical bases for classifying errors as either obvious or judgment
include ease of detection and potential for harm. In McKee, however,
the majority appeared to rely on neither criterion. Excessive doses
such as those in McKee are as easily detected as the obvious errors
93. Pharmacists' statutory standard of care is the "care, skill, and learning expected of a
reasonably prudent health care provider." WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040 (1989). Prior
Washington Supreme Court decisions interpret this standard as "society's expectations." See,
e.g., Harris v. Robert C. Groth, M.D., Inc., 99 Wash. 2d 438, 445, 663 P.2d 113, 117 (1983).
The McKee dissent adopted the "society's expectations" test. 113 Wash. 2d at 723, 782 P.2d at
1057 (Dore, J., dissenting). The majority in McKee did not rule out the "society's expectations"
test. Further, the majority stated that the standard is not the expectations of the pharmacy
profession. Id. at 717, 782 P.2d at 1054.
94. McKee, 113 Wash. 2d at 715, 782 P.2d at 1053.
95. The majority held that McKee's physician made a judgment error when he prescribed a
drug for ten years that he should have prescribed for no more than a few weeks. Id. at 716, 782
P.2d at 1053.
If the majority had classified McKee's physician's error as an obvious error, the court
nevertheless would have affirmed the summary judgment because McKee's only expert witness
was unqualified. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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listed by the majority.96 Further, excessive doses are as potentially
harmful as the non-lethal obvious errors listed by the majority because
excessive doses can cause serious illness and addiction.
The McKee majority cited Hand v. Krakowsk9 7 to support its dis-
tinction between obvious errors and judgment errors. Hand implies
that ease of error detection is critical to the distinction between obvi-
ous errors and judgment errors. The Hand discussion, however, only
illuminates the arbitrariness of the majority's classification.
In Hand, the pharmacist's records indicated that the patient was an
alcoholic, and the pharmacist knew that alcoholics should never take
the prescribed drug.98 The McKee majority emphasized that the con-
traindication in Hand was an obvious error.99 The obviousness of this
error, however, is hardly distinguishable from that in McKee.
McKee's pharmacists were-required to record and review her prescrip-
tion records."° Therefore, they should have known that they had sold
Plegine to McKee for ten years. McKee's pharmacists knew or should
have known that Plegine is appropriately prescribed for no more than
a few weeks because the manufacturer's labels contained this warning.
Early within this ten year period, the pharmacists should have realized
that McKee was no longer benefitting from the drug and that she was
in danger of its ill effects.
Similarly, the potential for harm in Hand is not substantially
removed from the potential for harm in McKee. The only distinction
between the physician's error in Hand and McKee is that the error in
Hand resulted in death, while the error in McKee resulted in physical
and psychological injury to the patient."' Fatality, however, should
not be dispositive in the determination of whether errors are obvious.
The majority did not require that "obvious" errors be fatal, other than
obvious lethal doses.12 Moreover, whether patients die from prescrip-
tion errors is relevant primarily to the seriousness of the error, not its
obviousness. Pharmacists can detect errors that will only injure as
96. For example, to detect incompatible prescriptions, which the majority lists as an obvious
error, pharmacists need to know that particular drugs are incompatible and that a patient is
using such drugs. To detect excessive doses, pharmacists have to know which doses are excessive
and how much and for how long the physician has prescribed the drug. Pharmacists could
detect the error in either case by their required review of prescription records.
97. 89 A.D.2d 650, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1982).
98. Id. at 122-23.
99. 113 Wash. 2d 701, 714-15, 782 P.2d 1045, 1052-53 (1989).
100. Washington law requires pharmacists to record and review the prescriptions they fill.
See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
101. Hand, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 122; McKee, 113 Wash. 2d at 704, 782 P.2d at 1047.
102. If fatality was to be determinative, a clear opinion would have so provided.
969
Washington Law Review
easily as they can detect fatal errors. Indeed, a pharmacist who
detected erroneous prescriptions could not be expected to predict
which would cause death and which only injury; only in egregious
cases could pharmacists anticipate the result. Finally, the critical
point in time to classify errors and determine pharmacists' liability is
when pharmacists dispense prescriptions. Determining liability based
upon a post-hoc recognition of the error's result obscures this essential
requirement.
If courts continue to rely on a distinction between error types, the
error in McKee must fall within the definition of obvious errors.
Including obviously excessive doses in the court's list of obvious errors
better promotes public safety. Pharmacists are potentially liable for
filling obviously erroneous prescriptions. Therefore, if excessive doses
are characterized as obvious errors, pharmacists would likely exercise
greater care in their reviews of patients' records in order to detect
these harmful errors. A holding encouraging greater care could help
prevent serious injuries and drug addiction.13
The McKee majority's separate rules for obvious and judgment
errors also are unworkable. Future litigants and pharmacists in prac-
tice cannot know exactly where responsibility for physicians' errors
lies. Pharmacists know that under McKee they are not responsible for
contacting physicians regarding non-lethal, but obviously excessive
doses.
The Washington rule's predictability, however, ends there. First,
pharmacists cannot predict whether they are liable for failing to con-
tact physicians about obvious errors because liability remains a jury
question.'4 Second, pharmacists cannot determine whether errors not
listed in McKee are judgment or, potentially, obvious errors.1 5 The
majority provided no guidelines for classifying errors.
103. Whether greater care would increase pharmacists' burdens at all is arguable. To the
extent greater care imposes a burden, potential benefits to the public justify broadened
pharmacists' duties.
104. In any given case, juries could go either way. For example, one jury may find a
pharmacist liable for failing to contact a physician that a certain dose is excessive. Another jury
confronted with the exact same fact situation, however, may find the pharmacist not liable. The
McKee rule precludes neither result.
105. For example, a physician might err by prescribing the wrong drug. Not only will the
patient's medical condition remain untreated, but if the drug has dangerous effects, the patient
may suffer. The majority does not mention this type of error, and pharmacists cannot predict
whether a court would label this harmful error "judgment" or "obvious."
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2. Jury Detennination of Error Type
Under McKee, pharmacists' liability depends on whether errors are
labeled by courts as judgment errors or obvious errors. This rule
allows courts to circumvent the legislature's "society's expectations"
test and decide cases' outcomes. 10 6 If a court believes a pharmacist
should not be liable in a particular case, the court can easily label the
error "judgment error" and, in practical terms, put an end to the
lawsuit.
The court should abandon this approach. If the court is determined
to adhere to its distinction between judgment errors and obvious
errors, however, the court should allow juries, rather than courts, to
classify errors. 107 The Washington legislature has provided that "soci-
ety's expectations" determine pharmacists' liability. Juries are micro-
cosms of society. Therefore, juries, not judges, are in the best position
to make decisions that express society's expectations.
3. Jury Determination in All Cases
The better rule is not to rely on error distinctions at all. Rather,
juries should determine pharmacists' duty of care in all cases. '08 Juries
should determine the standard of care because jurors, as representa-
tives of society, are best able to express "society's expectations."
Further, jury determination in all cases comports with legislative
intent. The legislature has provided that patients may recover when-
ever they are injured by pharmacists' breach of the care expected of
reasonably prudent pharmacists, and the court has interpreted this
standard as "society's expectations."' 9 When the court does not
allow juries to determine pharmacists' liability, however, it is in effect
106. See supra note 93.
107. Jury determination of error type, as well as jury determination in all cases, is as
unpredictable as the majority's rule. However, despite their unpredictability, these approaches
are better approaches because only they conform to statutory language and because they afford
more protection for prescription drug users. To ensure both more predictability and consumer
protection, the legislature should amend current statututes to require that pharmacists contact
physicians about any harmful errors.
108. This is the approach followed by courts in Louisiana, New York and New Jersey. See
supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
The majority discussed Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store, 457 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984),
to show that courts in jurisdictions with statutory standards of care similar to Washington's have
held that pharmacists have no duty as a matter of law. The statutory standard of care in Pysz
however, is not similar to Washington's. In Pysz the statutory standard of care is the standard of
the profession, while Washington's standard of care is society's expectations. Compare FLA.
STAT. § 766.102 (1988), quoted in McKee v. American Home Products, 113 Wash. 2d 701, 708
n.4, 782 P.2d 1045, 1049 n.4 (1989) with WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040 (1989).
109. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
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holding that patients may not always recover when pharmacists cause
injury by breaching society's expectations.
Leaving decisions to the jury accords with Washington's history of
consumer protectionism. In holding that pharmacists' duties do not
include informing physicians about judgment errors,110 the McKee
majority limited protection of prescription drug consumers.11 This
ruling is inconsistent with prior Washington Supreme Court decisions
expanding the degree of care required of suppliers of potentially harm-
ful goods and services. For example, in Helling v. Carey, 1 l2 the court
abandoned the prior professional practice standard in favor of the
broader "reasonable prudence" standard.113 This decision illustrates
the court's intent to promote public safety by imposing liability when-
ever potential health benefits outweigh marginal costs of safety protec-
tion. 114 McKee presented an opportunity for the court to reaffirm its
Helling approach. Like ophthalmologists testing for glaucoma, phar-
macists can easily and inexpensively detect physicians' prescription
errors. Therefore, they are in the best position to contact physicians
and prevent serious harm, such as drug overdose. The McKee court,
however, declined this opportunity to protect public health.
In Falk v. Keene Corp.,1I" a case decided only one month before
McKee, the court expanded public safety protection. Falk reestab-
lished a "consumer expectations" test for manufacturer design defects
even though the legislature provided that the test for design defects is
not consumer expectations.1 16 The court interpreted the legislation
broadly to provide that "consumer expectations" is an alternative to
the legislature's balancing test.1 17
The court's refusal to extend health protection to prescription drug
consumers in McKee is inconsistent with its holdings in both Helling
and Falk, which exemplify the court's intent to broaden protection of
consumers from potentially harmful goods and services. In Helling,
the court extended protection despite a lack of prior authority on
110. 113 Wash. 2d at 716, 782 P.2d at 1053.
111. If pharmacists are responsible for prescription errors, pharmacists will prevent some
harm. In a six month study at two children's hospitals, pharmacists checked prescriptions before
the hospital dispensed medication and found twenty-seven potentially fatal prescription errors.
The overall rate of errors in the study was 4.9 and 4.5 per 1,000 prescriptions. The most
common type of error was excessive doses. See Folli, Poole, Benitz, & Russo, Medication Error
Prevention by Clinical Pharmacists in Two Children's Hospitals, 79 PEDIATRICS 718 (1987).
112. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
113. See supra notes 18-20, 31 and accompanying text.
114. 83 Wash. 2d at 518, 519 P.2d at 983.
115. 113 Wash. 2d 645, 782 P.2d 974 (1989).
116. Id. at 654-55, 782 P.2d at 980. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
117. Id. The court was interpreting WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(l)(a), .030(3) (1989).
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point; in Falk the court broadly interpreted statutes to achieve public
protection. McKee presented similar issues of public health risks occa-
sioned by the failure of suppliers of services-pharmacists-appropri-
ately to prevent harms. The court's retreat from its tendency to
protect public safety is a surprising departure from prior sound judi-
cial decision.
B. Physician Notification: The Need for a Legislative Response
The court's abdication of its role as protector of public health in
McKee creates a need for legislative response. Absent a change in
judicial approach, the legislature should amend current statutes to
require that pharmacists contact physicians whenever the pharmacist
knows or should know that prescriptions as issued likely will harm
patients.118 The legislature should not, however, require pharmacists
to refuse to fill prescriptions or to warn patients.
Requiring pharmacists to notify physicians of any potentially harm-
ful error is justified for several reasons. First, courts have traditionally
held suppliers of potentially dangerous goods and services liable.119
Second, by detecting prescription errors and contacting physicians,
pharmacists could prevent serious harm or death. Prescription errors
are potentially more dangerous now than they were in the past."' This
increased danger justifies the imposition of a higher standard of care.
If pharmacists notify physicians whenever prescriptions appear harm-
ful, pharmacists will catch a large percentage of these errors, effec-
tively eliminating a great deal of unnecessary harm to patients.
118. The Maryland Court of Appeals has imposed a duty to contact physicians about unusual
prescriptions. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
119. According to an oft-quoted English case:
[W]henever one person supplies goods or machinery, or the like, for the purpose of their
being used by another person under such circumstances that every one of ordinary sense
would, if he thought, recognise at once that unless he used ordinary care and skill with
regard to the condition of the thing supplied, or the mode of supplying it, there will be
danger of injury to the person or property of him for whose use the thing is supplied, and
who is to use it, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill as to the condition or manner of
supplying such thing.
Heaven v. Pender, 1l Q.B.D. 503, 510 (1883); see also Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wash. 2d 645,
782 P.2d 974 (1989); Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
120. "In the past, prescription errors were not likely to be so dangerous, since oftentimes the
agents had very little or no pharmacologic effect. Unfortunately, this is not the case at present;
an error in prescription writing can quickly lead to a death." Friend, Principles and Practices of
Prescription Writing, 6 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 411, 412 (1965).
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Third, pharmacists are in the best position to most easily detect
physicians' prescription errors.1 21 Physicians err in prescribing medi-
cation if they are unaware of the dangers of prescribed drugs'22 or
incorrectly write prescriptions. Pharmacists can easily detect these
errors because pharmacists know the qualities of the drugs they sell.
Pharmacists have extensive drug education 2 3 and manufacturers send
warnings with drugs sold to pharmacies that pharmacists must read.
Accordingly, pharmacists' duties should include contacting physi-
cians about harmful prescriptions despite the additional work and
responsibility such duty would cause. The benefits to public safety
justify the marginal burden imposed on pharmacists by requiring them
to detect errors and contact physicians; public policy mandates that
pharmacists have increased responsibility over prescription errors
because pharmacists are the last, and perhaps the only, protection
patients have against incorrect prescriptions.
Contrary to the majority's reasoning in McKee, 124 imposing a duty
to notify physicians will create little work beyond what Washington
law already requires of pharmacists. 25 If pharmacists have a duty to
contact physicians about harmful prescriptions, they would have the
added responsibility of checking their records for a few more potential
problems, such as whether a prescribed dose is excessive, and contact-
ing the physician if the prescription is harmful. The burden imposed
is not onerous. 12
6
Further, expanding pharmacists' duties will not create antagonistic
physician-pharmacist relationships.'27 Physicians should not oppose
pharmacists' responsibility for prescription errors because by detecting
121. Pharmacists should have responsibility only for errors they can detect. Pharmacists will
not always know whether a particular prescription is harmful because pharmacists lack
physicians' medical training and knowledge of patients' medical histories. Further, pharmacists
should not have a duty to detect errors if the error involves long-term use of the drug and the
patient continually changes pharmacies.
122. Physicians often do not have time to research each drug they prescribe. Brushwood, The
Informed Intermediary Doctrine and the Pharmacist's Duty to Warn, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 349,
350-51 (1983).
123. To be licensed, Washington pharmacists must have either a baccalaureate degree in
pharmacy or a doctor of pharmacy degree. WASH. REv. CODE § 18.64.080(c) (1989).
124. 113 Wash. 2d 701, 716, 782 P.2d 1045, 1053 (1989).
125. Washington law requires that pharmacists maintain detailed records of prescriptions
they fill and review those records with each prescription filled. See supra notes 10-15 and
accompanying text.
126. McKee's pharmacists could have prevented her injury if they had simply read the
warning sent by the drug manufacturer, checked their records, and contacted her physician.
127. The McKee majority was concerned that expanded pharmacist responsibility would
create antagonistic physician-pharmacist relationships. McKee, 113 Wash. 2d at 716, 782 P.2d at
1053.
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prescription errors, pharmacists will prevent patients' harm and, thus,
decrease physicians' potential liability. 28 The possible benefits to pub-
lic health outweigh the slim possibility of an antagonistic effect on
physician-pharmacist relationships. If mutual responsibility increases
safety and decreases liability, the end result may, in fact, create closer
physician-pharmacist relationships, rather than antagomsm.
1. No Duty Beyond Notification
A pharmacist's responsibility should end after the pharmacist has
contacted the physician about the error. When pharmacists and phy-
sicians disagree about the safety of a prescription, one side must bear
the ultimate responsibility. This responsibility should fall on physi-
cians.'29 Physicians have a wider range of knowledge relating to the
decision of which variety of drug to use and how much to prescribe. 3 '
Although pharmacists have extensive drug education, physicians have
medical training and know intimately a patient's medical history. In
addition, pharmacists' deference to physicians' judgments after con-
tacting the physician could avoid some of the antagonism in physician-
pharmacist relationships feared by the McKee majority.
The failure of physician notification to absolve pharmacists' of lia-
bility would create additional problems. Pharmacists may refuse to fill
unusual prescriptions to avoid liability.' As a result, patients needing
unusual prescriptions may find it difficult to obtain their prescribed
medication. As the Maryland Court of Appeals in People's Service
Drug Stores v. Somerville noted, "[ilt would be a dangerous principle
to establish that a druggist cannot safely fill a prescription merely
because it is out of the ordinary. If that were done, many patients
might die from being denied unusual remedies in extreme cases."' 32
128. Physicians are liable for erroneous prescriptions if juries determine that society expects
reasonably prudent physicians not to make the prescription error. WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 7.70.020-.040 (1989).
129. Physicians may have valid reasons for deviating from safety recommendations about
particular drugs. Patients' unique conditions sometimes justify unusual prescriptions. Also, the
benefits of a drug for a particular patient may outweigh its harmful effects. Pharmacists should
defer to physicians' judgment in these situations.
130. McKee, 113 Wash. 2d at 711, 782 P.2d at 1051.
131. Pharmacists are not legally bound to fill prescriptions. Fink, Prescription Errors DRUG
THERAPY, April 1975, at 190, 195. Therefore, if a pharmacist believes a prescription is harmful
and the physician does not correct the prescription, pharmacists have the option to refuse to fill
it.
132. 161 Md. 662, 158 A. 12, 13 (1932).
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2. No Duty To Warn Patients
Policy reasons dictate that pharmacists contact physicians, rather
than patients, about harmful prescriptions. 133 First, patients look to
physicians as the primary health care provider. The proposed amend-
ment would reinforce this traditional relationship. Second, requiring
pharmacists to advise individual patients could create the antagonistic
physician-pharmacist relationships feared by the McKee majority.
Physicians may resent pharmacists' interfering with patient relation-
ships when pharmacists consult with patients rather than physicians.
Finally, physicians can easily correct erroneous prescriptions when
contacted by pharmacists, especially with pharmacists' advice. If
pharmacists are required to warn patients instead of physicians, how-
ever, patients will not take the medication and will lose confidence in
their physicians, both of which could hinder needed treatment.
III. CONCLUSION
Under McKee, pharmacists' duties do not include contacting physi-
cians when the physician has made a judgment error in prescribing
medication.' 34 In cases involving obvious prescription errors, however,
juries determine whether pharmacists should contact physicians.1 35 In
McKee, the majority's error classification is arbitrary, unpredictable,
and allows courts to deny pharmacists' liability even though the legis-
lature has provided that courts reserve this role for juries.
To conform with "society's expectations" and expand protection of
prescription drug consumers, the court should have either allowed
juries to classify physicians' errors or allowed juries to determine phar-
macists' duties in all cases. The latter approach is preferable and is the
only solution consistent with the legislature's intent as evidenced by
statutory language. Alternatively, the legislature could expand protec-
tion of prescription drug consumers by amending laws to require phar-
macists to contact physicians whenever the pharmacist knows or
should know that prescriptions, as issued, will likely harm patients.
Elizabeth D. Smith
133. For articles addressing pharmacists' duty to warn patients about the dangers of
prescription drugs, see, e.g., Brushwood & Simonsmeier, Drug Information for Patients, 7 J.
LEGAL MED. 279 (1986); Brushwood, The Informed Intermediary Doctrine and the Pharmacist's
Duty to Warn, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 349 (1983); Comment, Drug Products Liability: Duty to Warn,
49 U. PITr. L. REV. 283 (1987).
134. 113 Wash. 2d at 716, 782 P.2d at 1053.
135. See id. at 715, 782 P.2d at 1053.
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